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NOTES
FAMILY LAW—CHILDHOOD MORBID OBESITY: HOW EXCESS
POUNDS CAN TIP THE SCALES OF JUSTICE IN FAVOR OF REMOVING A
CHILD FROM THE HOME AND/OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
ABSTRACT
Due to the growing epidemic of obesity in the United States, courts
have begun addressing the issue of whether childhood morbid obesity is
a life threatening condition, the existence of which violates states’ child
abuse and neglect statutes, and warrants state involvement in the form
of removal of the child from the home or termination of parental rights.
Four states have thus far been presented with this question: Iowa, New
Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania. These courts, in deciding whether
or not to remove a morbidly obese child from the home, have considered
the weight and overall health and well-being of the child’s parents as a
relevant factor in determining whether or not the parents can provide
adequate care for their child’s specialized needs.
The author focuses her analysis on the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and argues that Massachusetts’s courts should deem
parents’ health and well-being a relevant factor in determining whether
parents are able to provide adequate care for their morbidly obese
children. The prior four courts’ inclusion of parents’ health and wellbeing, including their own morbid obesity, is wholly relevant to the best
interests of the child and is the appropriate standard for
Massachusetts’s courts to follow. This Note analogizes Massachusetts’s
consideration of parental fitness as a factor in a case involving an
incarcerated parent with the issue of considering parents’ health and
well-being as a factor in cases involving childhood morbid obesity. It
also compares the best interests of the child standard used in adoption
cases with the instant issue.
INTRODUCTION
I am not an average sixteen year old; I stand five feet three inches
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tall and weigh 451 pounds.1 I have had weight issues since I was an
infant, but in the past year, I gained one hundred pounds.2 Officials at
my school were concerned about my rapid weight gain, poor
performance, and absenteeism, so they had a gastroenterologist
evaluate me.3 My doctor diagnosed me with morbid obesity.4 She said
that my health had become a “life threatening situation” and admitted
me to the hospital.5 I also suffer from complications resulting from my
obesity: my liver is enlarged, I have hypertension, insulin resistance,
knee pain, and respiratory problems that cause me to wear an oxygen
mask at night.6 I do not have many friends; I spend about nine hours per
day either on my computer or watching television.7
My mom does not come with me to my doctors’ appointments
because she is obese as well and physically cannot leave our house.8 It
is especially hard for us because my dad died from a heart attack when
he was only thirty-seven years old, leaving just my mom to care for me.9
After my doctor’s evaluation, my mom voluntarily placed me in the
custody of the state.10 While I was in foster care, I was on a strict diet
and walked for exercise.11 In just under three months, I lost fifty

1. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 354 (C.P. 2002). According to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a sixteen-year-old boy in the fiftieth percentile should
weigh approximately 135 pounds. Weight-for-age Percentiles: Boys, 2 to 20 years, CTS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/growthcharts/data/set3/
chart%2003.pdf (last updated May 30, 2000).
2. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 355.
3. Id.
4. Id. The CDC measures overweight and obesity for adults and children by body mass
index (BMI), which is calculated using the individual’s height and weight. Basics about
Childhood Obesity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
obesity/childhood/basics.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2012). Categorization of overweight and
obesity for adults and children differ as “[a] child’s weight status is determined using an ageand sex-specific percentile for BMI rather than the BMI categories used for adults because
children’s body composition varies as they age and varies between boys and girls.” Id. The
CDC categorizes overweight children as “a BMI at or above the 85th percentile and lower
than the 95th percentile for children of the same age and sex,” and obese children as “a BMI
at or above the 95th percentile for children of the same age and sex.” Id. For adults, the CDC
defines overweight as a BMI between 25 and 29.9” and obesity as “a BMI of 30 or higher.”
Defining Overweight and Obesity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/defining.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2012).
5. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 355.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 354.
9. Id. at 354 n.1.
10. Id. at 355.
11. Id. at 356.
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pounds.12 Now, I want to go back home with my mom.13 However,
despite the fact that she wants me to come home too, I am court ordered
to remain in foster care.14
The above narrative is the unfortunate story of a sixteen-year-old
child, known as “D.K.” D.K.’s removal from his mother’s custody as a
result of his childhood morbid obesity was a case of first impression in
Pennsylvania.15 Although one may hope that D.K.’s situation is an
isolated case, the fact is that other cases have addressed childhood
morbid obesity in the United States.16
Obesity is a growing epidemic in the United States, and children are
no less susceptible than adults. As of 2010, almost seventeen percent of
children between the ages of 2 and 19 were obese.17 Obesity prevalence
within the same age group has almost tripled since 1980.18 Due to this
staggering increase, courts have begun addressing the issue of whether
childhood morbid obesity is a life threatening condition, the existence of
which violates states’ child abuse and neglect statutes, and warrants state
involvement in the form of removal of the child from the home or
termination of parental rights.
Four states have thus far been presented with this question: Iowa,
New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania.19 Because child protection
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 356, 361.
15. Id. at 354.
16. See In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); New Mexico ex rel.
Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. John R., 203 P.3d 167, 169 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009); In
re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (Fam. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 852 N.Y.S.2d 475 (App. Div.3d
2008).
17. Cynthia Ogden & Margaret Carroll, Prevalence of Obesity Among Children and
Adolescents: United States, Trends 1963-1965 Through 2007-2008, NAT. CTR. FOR HEALTH
STAT.
1, June 2010, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity_
child_07_08/obesity_child_07_08.pdf; see also Overweight and Obesity: U.S. Obesity Trends,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data
/trends.html (last updated July 21, 2011).
18. Overweight and Obesity: Data and Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/data.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2013).
19. See In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d at 452 (upholding the juvenile court’s finding that
“Liza” was a child in need of assistance and her removal from the home was in her best
interests); John R., 203 P.3d at 172 (adhering to the best interests of the child standard when
reviewing an appeal of an order terminating the rights of the parents of a morbidly obese
child); In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d at 831 (holding that removal of Brittany from the home
due to her morbid obesity and several comorbidities was “appropriate and necessary”); In re
D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 360 (ordering that D.K. remain in foster care in order to continue
addressing his morbid obesity and associated comorbidities).
The above four cases represent those opinions which have been published; this Note does
not foreclose the possibility that other cases involving removal of a morbidly obese child from

BRIERLEY FINAL 51313.DOC

132

5/15/13 2:43 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:129

law is statutorily defined and thus a creature of individual state law, in
order to thoroughly address this issue within the confines of this Note,
the analysis will focus on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.20
Although Massachusetts has not yet been presented with this issue, the
state “is experiencing an epidemic of childhood obesity”21 and will
undoubtedly hear such a case in the future.
At that time,
Massachusetts’s courts will be faced with a case of first impression and
will likely rely on prior case law in rendering an opinion.
Prior courts, in deciding whether or not to remove a morbidly obese
child from the home, have considered the weight and overall health and
well-being of the child’s parents as a relevant factor in determining
whether or not the parents can provide adequate care for their child’s
specialized needs. This Note argues that Massachusetts’s courts should
deem parents’ health and well-being a relevant factor in determining
whether parents are able to provide adequate care for their morbidly
obese children. The prior courts’ inclusion of parents’ health and wellbeing, including their own morbid obesity, is wholly relevant to the best
interests of the child and is the appropriate standard for Massachusetts’s
courts to follow.
Part I of this Note provides background on cases involving
childhood morbid obesity in the United States and the four prior courts’
analyses in determining that removal of four morbidly obese children
from their homes was the appropriate state action. Part II provides
background on the relevant federal and Massachusetts’s case law,
statutes, and regulations concerning the standard for removal of a child
from his or her home. Part III argues that Massachusetts’s courts should
follow the analysis and considerations of the prior case law including the
parents’ health and well-being and the parents’ own morbid obesity
when they are first presented with a case involving childhood morbid
obesity and state involvement. Part IV analogizes Massachusetts’s
consideration of parental fitness as a factor in a case involving an
his or her home have been heard in other jurisdictions but were decidedly not published in a
legal reporter. For example, court records and opinions may be sealed or otherwise
unavailable because of the concern for the sensitivity and privacy of the minor child involved.
20. Massachusetts is the home state of the Western New England Law Review as well as
a state that has not yet addressed this issue.
21. MPHA Issue Priority: Childhood Obesity, MASS. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N,
http://www.mphaweb.org/issues_childobesity.htm (last visited May 13, 2013).
The
percentage of overweight or obese children in Massachusetts is alarming, with “25-30 percent
of the state’s 10-17-year olds” included in this categorization. Id. It is important to note that
not all available statistics utilize the same age range for “children” and therefore should be
independently considered. This Note does not address the issue of appropriately defining the
term “children” or the standards of measuring morbid obesity.
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incarcerated parent22 with the issue of considering parents’ health and
well-being as a factor in cases involving childhood morbid obesity. It
also compares the best interests of the child standard used in adoption
cases with the instant issue.
I.

PRIOR CASE LAW

Four states have directly addressed the issue of state involvement in
cases involving morbidly obese children: Iowa, New Mexico, New
York, and Pennsylvania.23
A. Iowa: In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)
Iowa was the first of four states to hear a case involving childhood
morbid obesity. The case of In re L.T. involved the appeal of “Liza’s”
mother, Natalie, from the juvenile court’s order that her ten-year-old
daughter be placed in a residential treatment facility to help resolve her
morbid obesity, depression, and personality disorder.24 The basis of the
mother’s appeal was that the trial court erred in finding that Liza was a
“child . . . in need of assistance under Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(f) (1991),”
that reasonable efforts to prevent removal had been made, and that
residential group home placement was the least restrictive placement.25
1.

Pertinent Facts and the Court’s Analysis

Ten-year-old Liza’s struggle with obesity began around age seven
as a result of her parents’ unstable marriage as well as her father’s
alcohol abuse and subsequent physical abuse of her mother.26 During
the last two years of her parents’ marriage, Liza gained eighty pounds.27
After her parents’ divorce, Liza’s doctor advised Natalie that Liza
required psychiatric counseling as well as inpatient treatment for her
morbid obesity.28 At that time, Liza was ten years old, five feet three
inches tall, and 270 pounds.29
Liza was hospitalized for a one-month period following the
recommendation of a child psychiatrist.30 At the time of her admission
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See In re Care and Prot. of Amalie, 872 N.E.2d 741, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to the hospital, Liza’s weight had increased to 290 pounds and she “had
a yeast infection growing out of control in the skin creases on her
abdomen” which “produced an extremely strong body odor.”31 Liza was
officially diagnosed with “severe infantile personality disorder and a
problem with morbid obesity.”32 At the end of her one-month
hospitalization, Liza weighed 266 pounds and was recommended to a
residential treatment program to “address [her] potentially lifethreatening obesity.”33
Liza’s mother refused to place her in the residential treatment
program and did not schedule appointments with the hospital’s dietary
program.34 The State of Iowa accordingly initiated a court proceeding,
after which the juvenile court “found Liza to be a child in need of
assistance requir[ing] immediate treatment” of her morbid obesity.35
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Iowa placed “paramount
concern” on “the welfare and best interests of the child.”36 The appeals
court reviewed the record for “clear and convincing evidence” that Liza
was “a child in need of assistance.”37 The record showed that the cause
of Liza’s potentially life-threatening obesity was her chronic depression
and tendency to “overeat[] to relieve [that] depression.”38 The court also
upheld the juvenile court’s finding that Liza’s severe obesity interfered
with socialization that is required for a child “to develop physically,
mentally, and emotionally.”39
Unfortunately, Liza’s psychiatrist stated that Liza’s problems could
not “be effectively treated on an outpatient basis” and subsequently
recommended that Liza enroll in a residential program.40 Liza’s mother
was “unable to effectively assist Liza with her problem of obesity” and
on occasion even provoked and encouraged Liza to cope with her

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 452.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. In Iowa, a “[c]hild in need of assistance” is:
[A]n unmarried child who is in need of treatment to cure or alleviate serious mental
illness or disorder, or emotional damage as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression,
withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others and whose
parent, guardian, or custodian is unwilling or unable to provide such treatment.
Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 232.2(6)(f) (1991)).
38. In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d at 452.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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depression and stress with food.41 Liza failed to lose weight or attend
dietary classes while under her mother’s care, and her mother also
refused to consider inpatient treatment for Liza’s obesity.42 Due to
Natalie’s lack of cooperation and assistance with her daughter’s obesity,
the court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s finding that Liza was
“a child in need of assistance.”43 As such, her removal from the home
was necessary.44
B. Pennsylvania: In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353 (C.P. 2002)
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was presented with a case of
first impression regarding removal of a morbidly obese child from his
home in the case of In re D.K.45 Many of the pertinent facts of this case
are described in the introductory narrative. However, it is worthy of
reiteration that at the time of state intervention, D.K. was a morbidly
obese teenager in the sole custody of his morbidly obese and
housebound mother, Donna K.46 Donna K. voluntarily placed D.K. in
the custody of the Commonwealth and, three months after a successful
physician-supervised diet and exercise routine, D.K. sought to return
home to the custody of his mother.47 The issue before the trial court was
whether custody of D.K. should remain with the Commonwealth or be
restored to Donna K.
The Pennsylvania court began its analysis of this case by ensuring
its adherence to the Juvenile Act codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
6302(1) (West 2011).48 The court framed its analysis around the
question of whether D.K.’s mother could “provide the required level of
support and reinforcement required for her child’s specialized needs,”
not whether she could “care[] for a normal child.”49
In concluding that D.K.’s situation was one in which the
Commonwealth should intervene, the court used a “life threatening” test

41. Id.
42. Id. at 452-53.
43. Id. at 453.
44. Id.
45. 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 353 (C.P. 2002).
46. Id. at 354.
47. Id. at 355-56.
48. Id. at 357. The Juvenile Act permits the Commonwealth’s interference with the
family unit in circumstances involving “‘[a] child who (1) is without proper parental care or
control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his
physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.’” Id. (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302(1)
(West, 2011)).
49. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 357.
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to evaluate the severity of D.K.’s obesity.50 The court likened the
severity of morbid obesity and the need for Commonwealth intervention
to malnourishment cases “to the point of near starvation.”51 Based on
the medical testimony, the court ruled that Northumberland County
Children and Youth Services (CYS) “established by clear and
convincing evidence that” D.K. was properly removed from the home
and placed in CYS’s custody as a dependent.52
In considering whether D.K. should be reunited with his mother,
the court once again considered the intent of the Juvenile Act: to
preserve the family unit.53 Prior to separating a child from his or her
family, Pennsylvania courts consider whether CYS can provide the
parent with instructions for the skills needed to care for the child and
“provide follow-up supervision in the home.”54 In D.K.’s case, the court
held that his mother “d[id] not have the natural abilities typical of any
parent, as she [wa]s limited by her own extreme obesity.”55 The court
specifically focused on Donna K.’s inability to leave the home to attend
D.K.’s appointments, as well as her lack of initiative in seeking medical
attention for her son’s morbid obesity and related physical and
psychological issues, including absenteeism from school.56
The fact that D.K.’s morbid obesity was first addressed and
subsequently improved only after “his hospitalization and placement in
foster care” led the court to conclude that remaining in foster care at that
time was a necessity.57 Accordingly, the court noted that such placement
in foster care would last only as long as was necessary.58
The court issued an eighteen-count order following its decision.59
The order stipulated that D.K. must meet and maintain health and
lifestyle goals, including “a membership in a fitness facility,” before

50. Id. at 358. Under this test, the minor’s “obesity must be of a severe nature reaching
the life threatening or morbid state, which has also manifested itself in physical . . . or mental
problems.” Id.
51. Id. The case of D.K., the court argues, is at “the other end of the nourishment
spectrum.” Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b) (West 2011).
54. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 358-59.
55. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 360.
58. Id. The possibility of reunification was not foreclosed if, for example, Donna K.
was able to provide the necessary care and support of D.K.’s new eating and exercise regimen.
Id.
59. Id. at 361-62.
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returning home.60 The court’s order, however, was not solely focused on
D.K.; it also included provisions to which his mother must adhere prior
to reunification.61 These orders included Donna K.’s attendance at all of
D.K.’s medical appointments, cooperation with a resource worker for
nutritional help, providing appropriate foods as required by D.K.’s diet,
her attendance at counseling with D.K., and attention to her own health
and well-being.62
C. New York: In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Fam. Ct. 2007)
In re Brittany T. was a case of first impression before the Family
Court of New York.63 The issue before the court was whether it was in
the best interests of “Brittany,” a morbidly obese child suffering from
several comorbidities, to be removed from the home due to her parents’
lack of attention to her serious medical concerns.64
1.

Pertinent Facts

Brittany’s parents voluntarily placed her in foster care with the
Department of Social Services, which, in turn, placed her with her
maternal aunt.65 The court granted the placement “due to [the] serious
and continuing health concerns related to the child’s morbid obesity.”66
About five months after the placement, Brittany was returned to her
parents’ care.67 However, the reunion did not last long; Brittany was
once again placed in foster care as a result of her parents’ violation of
the court’s order.68 Between the ages of eight and twelve, Brittany’s
60. Id. at 361.
61. Id. at 362.
62. Id.
63. In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (Fam. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 852 N.Y.S.2d 475
(App. Div.3d 2008). The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed the Family
Court of New York’s holding on the finding that Brittany’s parents did not willfully violate
the order of supervision. In re Brittany T., 852 N.Y.S.2d at 480. For instance, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that Brittany’s parents did not willfully violate term
27, which required them to enroll Brittany at a local gym and ensure her attendance at least
two to three times per week. Id. at 479. The court concluded that “[t]he child’s attendance,
while not perfect, did represent a recognition by respondents of their obligations under the
terms of this order and, given the circumstances, constituted a good faith attempt to fulfill
them.” Id. This reversal did not address the court’s consideration of the parents’ overall
health and well-being in their ability to care for Brittany, nor did it discredit the appropriate
standard of review as clear and convincing evidence.
64. In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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weight ranged from 237 to 266 pounds.69
The Department of Social Services alleged that Brittany’s parents
violated the court’s previously issued order by failing to do the
following: ensure that Brittany regularly attend school, take her to the
gym at least two to three times per week, and participate in a nutrition
and education program.70
Testimony provided by a pediatric gastroenterologist and
nutritionist indicated that Brittany was considered morbidly obese
according to medical definitions.71 In addition to morbid obesity,
Brittany suffered from comorbidities, such as gallstones, fatty liver
disease, sleep apnea, high blood pressure, and pain in her knee joints;
she also experienced social and psychological impacts because of her
morbid obesity.72
Although Brittany’s doctor established a multidisciplinary program
including “behavior modification, lifestyle changes, dietary assistance,
and exercise therapy,” he expressed concern for Brittany’s overall lack
of success with the program.73 He expected Brittany’s health to
deteriorate further and become “life-limiting” if she did not receive
proper attention for her morbid obesity.74
2.

The Court’s Rationale

In evaluating this case, the court heard testimony from Brittany’s
pediatrician, school counselor, and the director of an eating disorder
center, who all opined that, although they had observed some
improvements in her physical and emotional health, their concerns
remained about her morbid obesity, school attendance, and emotional
well-being.75
Notably, the court then considered the overall health and well-being
of Brittany’s parents.76 The record showed that Brittany’s father was
forty-one years old, wheelchair bound, and suffered from

69. Id.
70. Id. at 831-32.
71. Id. at 833. The standard used in this case to determine morbid obesity was a
measurement of the child’s BMI. As noted in this case, a healthy BMI is between 18 and 25;
a BMI exceeding 40 is considered morbidly obese; and Brittany’s BMI was an astounding 50.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 834.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 834-35.
76. Id. at 835.
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cardiomyopathy, muscular dystrophy, arthritis, and scoliosis.77
Brittany’s mother was thirty-two years old and very obese herself,
weighing 436 pounds.78 Both parents testified that Brittany had missed
appointments and school days, but stated that they “tried their best.”79
Nonetheless, the lower court vehemently rejected Brittany’s parents’
explanations of their lack of compliance with the order of supervision
finding them to be “spurious, unpersuasive and largely lacking
credibility.”80
Although recognizing Brittany’s parents’ physical
limitations, the Family Court of New York ultimately held that “this
neither excuse[d] nor prohibit[ed] them from executing their parental
and court-ordered responsibilities.”81
While the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division ultimately reversed the Family Court’s holding, it
applied the same standard of clear and convincing evidence when
determining the best interests of the child.82
The lower court found that Brittany’s parents violated the terms of
the court’s order on the standard of willfulness and without just cause.83
Precedent case law in New York suggests that a clear and convincing
evidence standard should be applied in order to establish a willful
violation of the court’s order of supervision.84
The court concluded that Brittany’s parents willfully violated the
court’s clearly defined order of supervision without just cause by
missing Brittany’s nutrition appointments and failing to ensure Brittany
attended school.85 The result of such willful violation resulted in a
negative physical and emotional impact on Brittany.86 The court found
it shocking and inconceivable that Brittany’s parents had such a “lack of
commitment and motivation” in addressing Brittany’s morbid obesity
and thus held that Brittany’s parents willfully disregarded doctors’
77. Id.
78. Id. Brittany’s mother also suffered from breathing difficulties. Id.
79. Id. at 836.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 837.
82. In re Brittany T., 852 N.Y.S.2d 475, 480 (App. Div.3d 2008).
83. In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d at 837. The court made this analysis without
statutory authority. The court asserted that when lacking a statutorily defined standard, it is
up to the judiciary to determine what level of proof is required for any given proceeding. Id.
at 839. On appeal, the clear and convincing standard of proof in determining a violation of
the order of supervision was affirmed. In re Brittany T., 852 N.Y.S.2d at 478. Although the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division came to the opposite conclusion of the Family
Court of New York, it applied the same standard of proof and did not discredit the Family
Court’s consideration of the parents’ overall health and well-being in their analysis. Id.
84. In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
85. Id. at 837.
86. Id.

BRIERLEY FINAL 51313.DOC

140

5/15/13 2:43 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:129

advice so as to amount to a violation of the terms of the court’s order.87
When considering Brittany’s placement in light of the willful
violations of the court’s order, the court considered the best interests of
the child based on a totality of the facts and circumstances.88 Because
the consideration of removing Brittany from her home due to her morbid
obesity was an issue of first impression for the court, it relied on the
analysis in In re D.K., stating that:
[B]ecause of the parent’s limitations and the lack of attention in
addressing the child’s medical appointments and schooling, it was
clear that best interests required the continued placement of the child
in foster care until such time as the parent could “. . . demonstrate
the ability to offer the required assistance and support to her son,”
and until “. . . new eating habits, education and exercise programs
89
become more ingrained and of a habitual nature.”

The court also relied on the New York statutory definition of
neglect in concluding that Brittany was neglected by her parents due to
their failure to provide a minimum degree of care with respect to her
educational and medical needs, as measured by a reasonableness
standard.90 The potential negative consequences of state intervention
were also considered by the court and it was noted that state intervention
would likely not be justified in a case where the child was simply
overweight.91 The case of Brittany, however, involved a “severe, lifelimiting danger[] due to parental lifestyle and persistent neglect.”92
Thus, removal of Brittany from her home was justified.
The court agreed with the holding in In re D.K. that the instant case
“[wa]s no less a cause for determining neglect and ordering removal
than it was a matter where a child was at risk of life-limiting
consequences due to malnourishment.”93 The court confirmed that the
appropriate standard of removal due to the child’s morbid obesity should
be obesity “of a severe nature reaching the life threatening or morbid
state, which has also manifested itself in physical problems . . . or mental
problems.”94
Concluding that the Department of Social Services exceeded
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 838.
Id. (quoting In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 360 (C.P. 2002)).
In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d at 838-39.
Id. at 839.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 358).
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reasonable efforts to prevent removal, the court found that removal of
Brittany from her home and placement with the Department was in her
best interests.95 Return of Brittany to her parents was the court’s
ultimate permanency goal, but only at such a time as Brittany could
maintain a healthy weight and lifestyle, and when her parents were able
to provide adequate home, school and community support, including “an
environment conducive to healthy eating habits, exercise regimens, and
to meeting educational attendance requirements.”96
D. New Mexico: New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families
Department v. John R., 203 P.3d 167 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009)
This New Mexico case was on appeal based on the child’s right,
having reached the age of fourteen during the course of the proceeding,
to obtain counsel.97 However, the child’s mother argued on appeal that
the state “failed to make reasonable efforts to assist her in alleviating the
causes and conditions of neglect . . . failed to prove [she] was unable to
alleviate the causes and conditions of neglect, and the termination of
parental rights” could not have rested solely “on the best interests of the
child.”98 The court of appeals ultimately reversed the district court’s
decision, finding reversible error in failing to appoint the child her own
counsel upon reaching age fourteen.99 However, the court reiterated that
the best interests of the child standard should continue to govern when
hearing a proceeding to terminate parental rights.100
1.

Pertinent Facts

When the twelve-year-old child, whose name is not denoted, was
taken into custody by the state, she was already suffering from serious
and interrelated medical problems including hypothyroidism, sleep
apnea, mental retardation, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), and morbid obesity.101 The child “was virtually immobile
because her weight made it difficult for her to walk, even with a walker,
and her wheelchair was broken.”102 The child’s parents exacerbated her
health problems by not providing treatment or administering her
95. In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
96. Id. at 839-40.
97. New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. John R., 203 P.3d 167,
168 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 168-69.
102. Id.
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medicine.103 Based on a finding of neglect, the district court ordered the
child to remain in the custody of the state for up to two years while her
parents underwent a treatment plan aimed at reunification.104
After the child lost 120 pounds and her parents learned new
parenting and nutritional skills, the state arranged for the parents to take
the child for a trial home visit.105 Unfortunately, during the home visit,
the child’s health quickly deteriorated and she began gaining weight
back at a rate of two to three pounds per week.106 The state
recommended the child be returned to foster care and placed back in
treatment; she once again made great progress upon her return to foster
care.107 The state subsequently changed its permanency plan from
reunification to termination of parental rights.108
2.

The Court’s Analysis

Although a significant portion of the court’s opinion focused on the
reversible error committed by the district court in failing to appoint the
child her own attorney upon reaching age fourteen, the court also
addressed the mother’s argument on appeal that the best interests of the
child standard was improper as the basis for terminating her parental
rights.109 The court looked to the relevant New Mexico statute entitled
the “Children’s Code,” which provides that “the court must ‘give
primary consideration to the physical, mental and emotional welfare and
needs of the child, including the likelihood of the child being adopted if
parental rights are terminated.’”110 The court disagreed with the
mother’s argument, reiterating that parents do not have absolute rights to
raise their children without state involvement and that parental rights are
secondary to the child’s best interests.111
II. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: FEDERAL AND
MASSACHUSETTS STANDARDS
In all child protection cases, tension exists between “[t]he
103. Id.
104. Id. Part of the court’s order to the parents included “nutritional training.” Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. In addition, her parents were not facilitating treatment for her sleep apnea and
hypothyroidism. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 172.
110. Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-28(A) (West 2005)).
111. Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175, 1181 (N.M. Ct. App.
1993)).
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fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child”112 and the state’s two interests of “preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child and the fiscal and administrative
interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings.”113
Although courts are not accustomed to viewing weight as a factor in
parental fitness, due to the growing obesity epidemic in the United
States, courts should alter their perception of parental fitness to include a
parent’s morbid obesity as one factor. Some view morbid obesity as
merely another factor in a parental unfitness evaluation, requiring
nothing more than a routine application of well-established child
protection laws. However, there is a significant danger that societal
prejudice and preconceptions about morbid obesity will intrude on a
parent’s constitutionally protected right to raise his or her child. This
Note’s recommendation to Massachusetts’s courts is cognizant of and
protects against this danger.
The unique issue presented in In re D.K. and In re Brittany T.
concerns the morbid obesity not only of the children, but also of the
parents.114 Under the federal standard, in order for the state to succeed
in terminating the rights of a morbidly obese parent, it is required to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that such morbid obesity,
along with any other pertinent factors, gives rise to a finding of parental
unfitness.115 This level of proof, as compared with the lesser burden of
preponderance of the evidence, gives greater protection to the parents
against termination of their fundamental liberty to care for their children
as they see fit.116
The standard used in Massachusetts’s state courts for termination of
parental rights incorporates the federal requirement that the state prove
parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence117 and adds that
112. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
113. Id. at 766. The U.S. Supreme Court sought to protect the interests of both the
natural parents and the state by implementing a clear and convincing evidence standard in
order to terminate parental rights—a stricter standard than a preponderance of the evidence.
Id.
114. In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d 829, 835 (Fam. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 852 N.Y.S.2d 475
(App. Div.3d 208); In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 354 (C.P. 2002).
115. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48 (providing that the federal standard for
termination of parental rights requires the state to demonstrate parental unfitness by a clear
and convincing evidence standard).
116. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (Mass. 1980) (“Natural parents
should be denied custody only if they are unfit to further the welfare of their children.”).
117. See, e.g., Adoption of Mary, 610 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Mass. 1993) (“The judge must
find by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is presently unfit to provide for the welfare
and best interests of the child in order to grant a petition that terminates a natural parent’s
legal rights.”); Adoption of Lucinda, No. 07-P-1751, 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 890, at *2

BRIERLEY FINAL 51313.DOC

144

5/15/13 2:43 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:129

parental unfitness is assessed “by taking into consideration a parent’s
character, temperament, conduct, and capacity to provide for the child in
the same context with the child’s particular needs, affections, and
age.”118
In addition to the federal requirement described above,
Massachusetts also requires a showing by the state that termination of
parental rights is in the child’s best interests.119 These factors are
necessarily intertwined.120 In this respect, clear and convincing evidence
of parental unfitness acts as a condition precedent before the court can
evaluate the child’s best interests.121 In this regard, a mere showing of a
parent’s morbid obesity will not necessarily result in a finding of
parental unfitness. On a comparable issue, the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals held that “[i]n the absence of a showing that a cocaine-using
parent has been neglectful or abusive in the care of that parent’s child . .
. a cocaine habit, without more, [does not] translate[] automatically into
legal unfitness to act as a parent.”122
A similar comparison can be made to the 1980 case of Bezio v.
Patenaude, in which an openly homosexual single mother sought to
reverse the probate court’s holding because it failed to apply the parental
fitness test.123 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed
the probate court’s decision, concluding that:
A finding that a parent is unfit to further the welfare of the child
must be predicated upon parental behavior which adversely affects
the child. The State may not deprive parents of custody of their
children “simply because their households fail to meet the ideals
approved by the community . . . [or] simply because the parents
(Mass. App. Ct. July 25, 2008) (“Before terminating a parent’s rights to his biological child, a
judge must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is currently unfit to provide
for the welfare and best interests of his child.” (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48)).
118. Adoption of Mary, 610 N.E.2d at 902.
119. See generally Adoption of Ilona, 944 N.E.2d 115, 121 (Mass. 2011); In re
Adoption of Xan, No. 10-P-2244, 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 707, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. May
25, 2011).
120. Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1214-15 (“Neither the ‘parental fitness’ test nor the ‘best
interests of the child’ test is properly applied to the exclusion of the other . . . . [T]he tests are
not separate and distinct but cognate and connected.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
121. Id. at 1211 (“[I]t is a fundamental principal that the Commonwealth may not
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family without an affirmative showing of parental
unfitness.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
122. Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d 256, 261 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). Courts may,
however, “consider past conduct [including a previous pattern of abuse or neglect] to predict
future ability and performance.” Id.
123. Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1211.
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embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds with the average.”

Based on the facts in Bezio, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts concluded that there was no automatic “correlation
between the mother’s homosexuality and her [parental] fitness.”125 This
conclusion is analogous to the holding in Adoption of Katharine that
there is no automatic conclusion of parental unfitness based on a
parent’s drug habit.126
Unlike D.K., the children at issue in Adoption of Katharine and
Bezio were not suffering any adverse effects from their parents’ alleged
unfitness.127 Comparing these children to D.K., whose severe morbid
obesity was first brought to light only after the state intervened, begs the
question whether parents’ morbid obesity does in fact directly correlate
with parental unfitness, unlike drug habits and homosexuality.128 The
facts of In re D.K. certainly could lead to such a conclusion. However,
such a sweeping generalization would not be in keeping with the federal
or Massachusetts standard for termination of parental rights.
Courts must apply both the parental fitness and the best interests of
the child tests, which are largely intertwined, to the facts of the case
before them. To conclude that a parent’s morbid obesity necessarily
results in a finding of unfitness prior to considering the facts of the case
would constitute overreaching by the state and deny natural parents their
fundamental right to raise their children as they see fit. Simply
disagreeing with a lifestyle choice would not be grounds for termination,
absent other conclusory facts tending to support parental unfitness and
that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.129
As exemplified by societal attitudes prior to Bezio, at one time,
sexual orientation was seen as grounds to deprive a parent of his or her
124. Id. at 1216 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
125. Id.
126. Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d at 261. Drug addiction alone does not create
per se parental unfitness, but often the problems associated with drug addiction, such as
poverty and intoxication, do provide for a finding of parental unfitness. Id.
127. See, e.g., Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1215-16; Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d at 257
(the record reflected that Katharine was “very alert . . . very happy and healthy . . . very
neat.”).
128. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 360 (C.P. 2002).
129. Furthermore, although 80% of obese children have at least one obese parent, the
opposite conclusion cannot be similarly asserted; that is, just because a parent is obese does
not necessarily mean that his or her child is or will become obese. See infra note 165.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate for Massachusetts’s courts to automatically determine
parental unfitness in a case involving a morbidly obese parent. Rather, parental unfitness
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and necessarily incorporate the best interests of the
child.
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constitutional right to raise his or her child.130 As a society, we must
ensure that morbid obesity is not treated in the same fashion. While a
parent’s morbid obesity can and should be one relevant factor in the
determination of parental unfitness, it should not be completely
dispositive of parental unfitness.
As a final precursor to seeking termination of parental rights,
Massachusetts requires the Department of Children & Families (DCF) to
make “reasonable efforts” to return the child to his or her natural
parents.131 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has even gone so far
as to incorporate this requirement into its statutory scheme.132 The
General Laws of Massachusetts proclaim the Commonwealth’s policy is:
[T]o direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement
of family life for the protection and care of children; to assist and
encourage the use by any family of all available resources to this
end; and to provide substitute care of children only when the family
itself or the resources available to the family are unable to provide
the necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any child to
sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral
133
development.

The intent of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is clearly set
forth in the above statute. The policy is broad enough to encompass
removal of a morbidly obese child and termination of parental rights if
DCF can demonstrate parental unfitness by clear and convincing
evidence, that state involvement is in the child’s best interests, and that
DCF made reasonable efforts to preserve the family unit. If DCF can
meet the parental fitness and best interests of the child standards, the
above statute provides for removal of a child when necessary to “insure .
. . sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral
development.”134 Childhood morbid obesity significantly impairs the
child’s “sound health and normal physical . . . development” and, thus,
to remove a morbidly obese child from his or her home, upon a showing
of parental unfitness and the child’s best interests, is harmonious with
the policy of the Commonwealth.135
130. Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1215.
131. Adoption of Ilona, 944 N.E.2d 115, 122 (Mass. 2011).
132. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1 (West Supp. 2011).
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added) (emphasizing that “[t]he health and safety of the child shall
be of paramount concern and shall include the long-term well-being of the child”).
135. Id. Although seemingly in concert with the intent of the Commonwealth, the
argument could be made that removal of morbidly obese children from their homes is
discriminatory against certain races, ethnicities, and socio-economic classes that have a higher
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Statutory compilations and state codes of regulation provide courts
with guidance when reviewing cases of first impression.136 Statutes and
regulations were used in the prior cases to ensure compliance with
departmental goals regarding the appropriateness of state intervention
into the family unit, to define the relevant terms at issue, and to
determine the requisite standard of review and burdens of proof.
The Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR) provides similar
guidance upon which a court could rest when hearing a case of first
impression involving the removal of a morbidly obese child from his or
her home and the possible termination of parental rights.137 Courts
should consider the intent and essence of the CMR, as it pertains to
DCF, as well. The specific CMR sections that provide guidance in this
area are “Glossary,”138 “Statement of Philosophy,”139 and “Principles of
prevalence of childhood obesity. For instance, in “2007-2008, Hispanic boys, aged 2 to 19
years, were significantly more likely to be obese than non-Hispanic white boys, and nonHispanic black girls were significantly more likely to be obese than non-Hispanic white girls.”
Overweight and Obesity: NHANES Survey (1976-1980 and 2003-2006), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/prevalence.html (last
updated Jan. 11, 2013). See also Katherine Unger Davis, Racial Disparities in Childhood
Obesity: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 313, 320-21
(2011). Although these statistics tend to show a true disparity in the prevalence of obesity
between races, ethnicities, and socio-economic classes, as long as Massachusetts’s courts
strictly apply the parental unfitness and best interests of the child tests as well as provide
reasonable accommodations for parents’ special needs prior to seeking termination of parental
rights in a case involving a morbidly obese child, such termination of parental rights would
not be deemed a pretext for discrimination.
136. Indeed, the Pennsylvania court in In re D.K. began its analysis by ensuring its
adherence to the Juvenile Act’s limitations on state involvement into family life. In re D.K.,
58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 357 (C.P. 2002). Similarly, the Iowa court in In re L.T. looked to the
statutory definition of a “child in need of assistance” in order to conclude that Liza fell
squarely within the statutory framework which would thus warrant state intervention. In re
L.T., 494 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). The state of New Mexico also sought
statutory support for its best interests of the child analysis and termination of parental rights.
New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. John R., 203 P.3d 167, 171-72
(N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
137. See generally 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.01, 1.02, 2.00 (2008).
138. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.00 (2008) (defining in relevant part the following:
“child” (“[A] person who has not reached his/her 18th birthday, but does not include unborn
children.”); “emergency” (“[A] situation where the failure to take immediate action would
place a family and/or child at substantial risk of serious and imminent family disruption, or
death, or serious emotional or physical injury.”); “mature child” (“[A] child who is able to
understand the circumstances and implications of the situation in which he/she is involved and
is able to participate in the decision-making process without excessive anxiety or fear. A
child . . . 14 years of age or older is presumed to be a mature child.”); “medical emergency”
(“[A]ny immediately life threatening condition . . . includ[ing] . . . any condition where delay
in treatment will endanger the life, limb or mental well being of the patient.”); and “neglect”
(“[F]ailure by a caretaker, either deliberately or through negligence or inability, to take those
actions necessary to provide a child with minimally adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, supervision, emotional stability and growth, or other essential care.”)).
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Service.”140 An analysis of these sections helps to capture the intent of
the CMR. Once the intent of the CMR is established, it can be
extrapolated to apply to cases involving removal of morbidly obese
children from their homes. Part III of this Note will explain how
Massachusetts’s courts can use the Commonwealth’s intent,
demonstrated by case law, statutes, and regulations, in their evaluation
of the first case involving removal of a morbidly obese child from his or
her home.
III. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MASSACHUSETTS’S
FIRST CASE INVOLVING REMOVAL OF A MORBIDLY OBESE CHILD FROM
THE HOME
Prior courts, in deciding whether or not to remove a morbidly obese
child from the home, have considered the weight and overall health and
well-being of the child’s parents as a relevant factor in determining
whether or not the parents can provide adequate care for their child’s
specialized needs. Massachusetts’s courts, when first presented with this
issue, should consider parents’ health and well-being as a relevant factor
in determining whether parents are able to provide adequate care for
their morbidly obese children. The prior courts’ inclusion of parents’
health and well-being, including their own morbid obesity, is wholly
relevant to the determination of parental unfitness and the best interests
of the child and is the appropriate standard for Massachusetts’s courts to
follow.
The decisions of the prior courts do not explicitly include the
courts’ analyses of parental fitness.141 Instead, the courts placed greater
139. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.01 (2008) (addressing the goal of DCF, which is to
“strengthen and encourage family life so that every family can care for and protect its
children”). In support of this goal, DCF attempts to assist families in order to maintain family
unity. However, if a family cannot provide the necessary care for its children, DCF “will
intervene to protect the right of children to sound health and normal physical and mental
development.” Id. This section is particularly cautious about DCF’s balance between its dual
obligations of protecting children while also respecting the right of families to be free from
state intervention; striking this balance will govern DCF’s activities. Id.
140. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.02 (2008) (seeking to protect children’s safety and
promote “stability and permanency” and acknowledging that “the family is the best source of
child rearing,” and “that substitute care is a temporary solution”).
141. See Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Mass App. Ct. 1997) (“At the
core of the inquiry is the question of what is in the best interests of the child, although the
answer to that question in any given case is bound up with the determination of unfitness. The
child’s best interests may bear on how much parental deficiency is tolerable, or, conversely,
the degree of parental deficiency may determine the child’s best interests.”).
The prior courts did, however, include some discussion of parental unfitness. See, e.g.,
In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d at 452 (finding that Liza’s mother was “unable to effectively assist
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emphasis on applying the facts of each case to the best interests of the
child standard.142 Massachusetts’s courts, upon establishing parental
unfitness, should follow the prior courts’ analyses and dedicate more of
their focus to the best interests of the child. The best interests of the
child standard considers the physical and emotional health of the child,
including whether the child is suffering from a life-threatening illness.143
As suggested by its name, under this standard, the emphasis of the court
is on the child; parental rights are secondary.
Because the four prior cases were cases of first impression in their
respective jurisdictions, the courts appropriately began their analyses by
ensuring compliance with applicable child abuse and neglect statutes.144
For example, the court in In re D.K. relied on the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act for relevant definitions and statutory intent
surrounding the removal of a child from the home.145 In addition to
relying on applicable statutes for guidance in resolving these issues of
first impression, the more recent cases considered the standard of review
used in previous decisions. Specifically, the court in In re Brittany T.
relied heavily upon the analysis provided in In re D.K., despite the fact
that these cases were decided in different jurisdictions.146 Similarly,
when Massachusetts is presented with this issue, it should first consult
the General Laws of Massachusetts and the CMR for guidance. It
should then consider the analyses performed by the prior courts.
Although the holdings in these cases are not binding upon
Massachusetts’s courts, the analyses made by the prior courts can be
Liza with her problem of obesity”); John R., 203 P.3d at 169 (finding that the child was
neglected in part due to her parents’ exacerbation of her health problems by not providing
treatment and administering medicine); In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d 829, 838-39 (Fam. Ct.
2007); rev’d, 852 N.Y.S.2d 475 (App. Div.3d 2008) (concluding that Brittany was neglected
by her parents due to their failure to provide a minimum degree of care with respect to her
educational and medical needs); In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 359 (concluding that D.K.’s
mother “d[id] not have the natural abilities typical of any parent, as she [wa]s limited by her
own extreme obesity”) (emphasis added).
142. See, e.g., John R., 203 P.3d at 172; In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d at 831, 838-39.
143. See In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d at 452; John R., 203 P.3d at 172; In re Brittany T., 835
N.Y.S.2d at 838.
144. See, e.g., In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d at 452 (citing IOWA CODE § 232.2(6)(f) (1991));
John R., 203 P.3d at 172 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-28(A) (West 2005)); In re D.K.,
58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 357 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302(1) (West 2011)).
145. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 357-58 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302(1)
(West 2011)).
146. In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d at 839. The two cases are even more connected as
it has been noted that both rely on testimony provided by the same medical expert, Dr.
Cochran, regarding the children’s morbid obesity. Id. at 834; In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at
362; Coyla J. O’Connor, Note, Childhood Obesity and State Intervention: A Call to Order!,
38 STETSON L. REV. 131, 147 n.85 (2008).
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used as persuasive support for concluding that a morbidly obese child
should or should not be removed from his or her home based on the
totality of the facts and circumstances.
A. Standard for Removal of a Child From the Home
As previously mentioned, the prior cases did not include detailed
consideration of the parental unfitness prong required by the federal and
Massachusetts standards for removal of a child from his or her home.147
Instead, the focus of the prior courts was on the best interests of the
child, which is necessarily evaluated in connection with the parental
fitness test.148 The best interests of the child standard encompasses the
health and well-being of the parents because a parent’s inability to
provide adequate care for the child’s physical and emotional needs can
warrant state involvement to protect the child.149 For example, in D.K.’s
situation, his mother was physically unable to leave the home to
accompany him to his medical appointments.150 In fact, it was not until
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania intervened that D.K.’s serious
medical afflictions were even brought to light.151
Although
disconcerting, it is possible that the first case presented to a
Massachusetts court could resemble these facts. In that instance, the
court would need to determine whether or not the parents’ health and
well-being, including the parents’ own morbid obesity, conflicts with the
child’s best interests.
The Pennsylvania court determined that a morbidly obese parent,
such as Donna K., cannot provide adequate care for a morbidly obese
child.152 It is for that reason that parental health and well-being,
147. See infra Part IV.A (analogizing the parental unfitness standard in cases finding
parental unfitness of morbidly obese parents to those finding parental unfitness of incarcerated
parents).
148. Parental unfitness and the best interests of the child are largely intertwined in
courts’ analyses. See, e.g., Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Mass App. Ct.
1997).
149. It should be noted that the best interests of the child is only one factor in justifying
state intervention. The child’s morbid obesity must also be a life threatening condition. See
generally Melissa Mitgang, Childhood Obesity and State Intervention: An Examination of the
Health Risks of Pediatric Obesity and When They Justify State Involvement, 44 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 553, 556-59 (2011). The author agrees that state intervention is drastic and
should only be used when the child’s obesity is life threatening, so as to prevent state
intervention in cases of mere overweight children. Using a more lenient standard would
unjustifiably infringe upon parents’ rights, while using a stricter standard would not
sufficiently protect morbidly obese children.
150. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 354.
151. Id. at 360.
152. Id. at 357.

BRIERLEY FINAL 51313.DOC

2013]

CHILDHOOD MORBID OBESITY: PARENTAL RIGHTS

5/15/13 2:43 PM

151

including morbid obesity, should be incorporated by Massachusetts’s
courts into the best interests of the child standard.153
In re D.K. is not the only opinion that Massachusetts’s courts could
consult to decide whether or not to include parents’ health and wellbeing in this determination—the Family Court of New York in In re
Brittany T. provides supporting evidence that this inclusion would be
appropriate in a case of first impression in Massachusetts. Recall that,
like Donna K., Brittany’s mother was also very obese and exhibited a
lack of compliance with the court’s order to ensure that Brittany
attended school, went to a gym, and participated in nutrition and
education programs.154 The Family Court of New York followed the
analysis in In re D.K. by considering the best interests of the child and
ultimately concluding that removal from the home was the appropriate
state action.155 In so concluding, the New York court examined the
totality of the facts and circumstances and determined that the state
showed by clear and convincing evidence that Brittany’s parents
willfully violated the court’s order.156 Therefore, it was in Brittany’s
best interests to remain in foster care at that time.157
In further consideration of the best interests of the child standard,
the Family Court of New York continued its analysis by determining
whether Brittany’s parents willfully violated the court’s order.158 In this
analysis, the court considered the health and well-being of Brittany’s
parents, including her father’s physical confinement to a wheelchair and
her mother’s obesity and resulting comorbidities.159
The recommendation to Massachusetts to consider the physical
disability of a parent would be inconsistent with 110 MASS. CODE REGS.
1.09 (2008), which prohibits discrimination against a disabled individual
who receives DCF services. However, Massachusetts has not expressly
incorporated morbid obesity in its statutory definition of disability.160 It
153. This argument is not meant to assert that a morbidly obese parent cannot care for
any child, but rather that a morbidly obese parent such as Donna K. cannot adequately care for
a child who has serious and specialized needs due to the child’s own morbid obesity. The
court in In re D.K. addresses this concern by framing the issue as whether Donna K. could
“provide the required level of support and reinforcement required for her child’s specialized
needs,” not whether she could care for a “normal child.” Id.
154. In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831-32, 835 (Fam. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 852
N.Y.S.2d 475 (App. Div. 2008).
155. Id. at 838.
156. Id. at 837.
157. Id. at 838-39.
158. Id. at 836.
159. Id. at 835.
160. MASS GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 19C, § 1 (West 2011). Nor has federal law. See 42
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can be argued that including a parent’s own morbid obesity comports
with both federal and Massachusetts’s notions of protection against
disability discrimination with regard to services provided by DCF. The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Massachusetts antidiscrimination laws, and the Constitution require DCF to reasonably
accommodate the parents’ special needs prior to seeking termination of
parental rights.161 Therefore, regardless of whether Massachusetts courts
currently, eventually, or never consider morbid obesity a disability by
definition, DCF must first provide reasonable accommodations for the
parents’ special needs prior to seeking a termination proceeding. The
courts in prior cases provided accommodations to special needs
parents,162 and Massachusetts’s courts should follow suit in their first
case involving removal of a morbidly obese child from a home with
special needs parents.
Since it is not inherently discriminatory for Massachusetts to
consider the health and well-being of a morbidly obese child’s parent in
the context of the best interests of the child standard, Massachusetts’s
courts should also include the emotional and mental health of the parent
in this standard. The court in In re L.T. did this when it concluded that
Liza’s mother was uncooperative with DCF and was even provoking
Liza’s stress-induced eating.163 Living in such an environment was not
in the child’s best interests, and the court accordingly ordered that Liza
remain in foster care.164 Although not physically unable to provide
adequate care for her daughter’s specialized needs, Natalie was unable to
U.S.C. §12102(2) (1991); EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 976 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(“[N]either the case law nor the applicable regulations include morbid obesity as a disability
under the ADA.”). In the employment context, the state of Michigan has broadly interpreted
its discrimination laws to afford protection to overweight employees from discrimination
based on weight. Teri Morris, Note, States Carry Weight of Employment Discrimination
Protection: Resolving the Growing Problem of Weight Bias in the Workplace, 32 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 173, 177 (2010). This example does not detract from the crux of this Note’s
argument because, regardless of a parent’s purported or actual disability, the court must first
assess parental ability and fitness to provide adequate care for the child and then determine the
best interests of the child. See Adoption of Mary, 610 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Mass. 1993);
Adoption of Xan, No. 10-P-2244, 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 707, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. May
25, 2011). For Massachusetts’s courts to rule otherwise “would improperly elevate the rights
of the parent above those of the child.” In re Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 120, 125
(Mass. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
161. In re Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d at 126.
162. See State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. John R.,
203 P.3d 167, 169 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (providing the parents with parenting and nutritional
education and trial home visits with their daughter, all of which proved unsuccessful, prior to
termination of parental rights).
163. In re L.T., 494 N.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).
164. Id. at 453.
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emotionally support her daughter and assist in combating her lifethreatening morbid obesity. The analysis performed by the Iowa court in
In re L.T. to include parents’ emotional and mental ability to provide
adequate care for the morbidly obese child should be followed by
Massachusetts’s courts if the facts presented provide for such an
analysis.
B. Further Considerations in Shaping a Recommendation to
Massachusetts’s Courts
Included in the analyses of the prior cases is the parents’ overall
health and well-being, including the manifestation of morbid obesity or
other physically debilitating ailments of one or both parents. The prior
courts have all applied similar standards of review for this type of case
and have included the morbidly obese child’s parents’ overall health and
well-being including physical, mental, and emotional limitations that
would significantly impact the parents’ ability to provide adequate care
for the specialized needs associated with the child’s morbid obesity. The
courts in each of these cases did not come to such a conclusion lightly,
nor was it based on mere hypothetical situations that could result if the
child were returned to his or her parents’ care without further state
intervention. Relapses, for instance, caused the court to give more
consideration to factors such as the parents’ health and well-being in
determining the best interests of the child.165
The problem Massachusetts would seek to prevent arises when the
morbidly obese child returns to a home with parents who do not instill
the nutrition and exercise regimens taught to the child while in foster
care, resulting in the child’s relapse to old habits and rapid weight
regain. The child in John R. had successfully lost 120 pounds in foster
care and upon her return to her mentally and emotionally unsupportive
parents, the child gained between two and three pounds per week.166
This deteriorative behavior should be of utmost concern to the
Massachusetts court that first crafts an opinion and plan for
165. One possible reason for relapses is the fact that approximately 80% of obese
children have at least one obese parent. Lindsey Murtagh, Judicial Interventions for Morbidly
Obese Children, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 497, 498 (2007). Although not dispositive, this
assertion tends to support the prior courts’ inclusion of parents’ weight as a factor in
determining the best interests of the child. When a parent, due to obesity, is physically unable
to care for his or her child’s specialized needs, it is only appropriate for the court to interfere
with the family unit in order to protect the child. It is not unreasonable for the court to order a
parent to address his or her own health concerns before reunification of the child and parent
can occur. See, e.g., In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 362 (C.P. 2002).
166. John R., 203 P.3d at 169. The child was returned to foster care and once again lost
weight and received proper nutrition. Id.
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reunification.
In order to prevent relapses from occurring, the prior courts ordered
not only that the morbidly obese child remain in foster care until further
review, but also that the parents meet certain goals enumerated in the
courts’ orders. For example, the Pennsylvania court in In re D.K. issued
an eighteen-count order requiring, inter alia, that Donna K. attend all of
D.K.’s medical appointments before reunification could occur.167 One
may argue that such an order is inherently discriminatory against Donna
K. based on her morbid obesity. It is undisputed that at the time the
order was written, it was physically impossible for Donna K. to
accompany D.K. to his doctors’ appointments because she was
housebound due to her extreme obesity.168 Accordingly, it appears that
the only way Donna K. would be able to satisfy the court’s order and
regain custody of her child would be to lose weight. Opponents may
argue that courts should not be given such discretion when interfering
with the family unit and that future courts, when issuing an order or plan
for reunification, should not follow the Pennsylvania court by
discriminating against morbidly obese parents and unjustifiably
mandating that a parent lose weight in order to be reunified with his or
her child.
Despite arguments to the contrary, it would be appropriate and
within the statutory boundaries for Massachusetts’s courts to issue an
order similar to the Pennsylvania court in In re D.K. if the totality of the
facts and circumstances led the court to conclude that it was in the best
interests of the child to remain in foster care.169 Although the short term
benefits of removal may be manifested in the form of immediate weight
loss, Massachusetts’s courts should also carefully consider the long-term
benefits of intervention: preservation of the family unit and alteration of
the child’s behavior. Interventions aimed at the family as a unit instead
of the child as an individual may be more successful in achieving longterm results because parents serve as role models to their children both

167. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 361.
168. Id. at 354.
169. The author suggests that Massachusetts’s courts use the order in In re D.K. as an
example of the requirements of both the child and the parent(s) prior to restoration of custody.
See id. at 361-63 (requiring for example that D.K. “obtain and maintain a healthy weight and
lifestyle . . . obtain and maintain a membership in a fitness facility” and that Donna K.
“cooperate[] with a resource worker for help with nutrition . . . provide the appropriate foods
in the home and prepare them as required by the diet . . . provide a safe, stable, and healthy
home environment . . . address her own health concerns and well-being . . .”). An order
addressing both the child and the parent(s) will help ensure that the entire family is involved
in restoring custody with the natural parents and preserving the family unit.
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in diet and in exercise.170 Such interventions may altogether avoid
termination of parental rights.
The Massachusetts neglect statute requires parents to provide
“necessary and proper physical . . . care.”171 Massachusetts permits state
intervention in extremely limited circumstances of child neglect where
the courts find that treatment would be life-prolonging. However,
Massachusetts’s interpretation of its neglect statute is strict and does not
expand the definition of neglect.172 In order for Massachusetts to
remove a morbidly obese child from the home or terminate parental
rights, the court would have to interpret the state’s child neglect statute
to include morbid obesity. Although Massachusetts is particularly aware
of its dual obligation to protect children while also limiting unwarranted
state intervention,173 it should nonetheless interpret its neglect statute to
include morbid obesity, because the interest of protecting these children
far surpasses the state’s policy of limiting government intervention.
Childhood morbid obesity is life threatening and without state
intervention on the basis of neglect, these children are at risk of dying an
early and preventable death.174
IV. ANALOGOUS CASE LAW IN SUPPORT OF MASSACHUSETTS’S
ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL FITNESS AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD STANDARD
Massachusetts’s case law on the parental fitness of incarcerated
parents as well as a Missouri case involving the denial of a morbidly
obese parent’s adoption application can be analogized to the instant issue
to strengthen the argument that Massachusetts’s courts should follow the
multi-jurisdictional case law that has been developed in childhood
170. See generally Murtagh, supra note 165, at 499 (asserting that courts should involve
the family as a whole in order to properly address and correct the poor eating and exercise
habits of parents and other role models that could otherwise continue to hinder the child’s
progress during and after state involvement).
171. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 24 (West Supp. 2012).
172. Shireen Arani, Case Comment, State Intervention in Cases of Obesity-Related
Medical Neglect, 82 B.U. L. REV. 875, 884 (2002). Author Stephanie Sciarani suggests four
types of jurisdictions, which are split on neglect statutes: strict construction, restrained
construction, moderate construction, and broad construction jurisdictions. Massachusetts is a
strict construction jurisdiction. This leaves little room for statutory interpretation, because the
definition of negligence accounts only for “harm stemming from failure to provide the
necessities of life.” Stephanie Sciarani, Note, Morbid Childhood Obesity: The Pressing Need
to Expand Statutory Definitions of Child Neglect, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 313, 319 (2010).
173. See 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.01 (2008).
174. The average life expectancy of people who are severely obese is reduced by an
estimated 5 to 20 years. S. Jay Olshansky et al., A Potential Decline in Life Expectancy in the
United States in the 21st Century, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1138, 1140 (2005).
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morbid obesity jurisprudence. When determining the parental fitness of
an incarcerated parent, Massachusetts’s courts have considered the best
interests of the child.175 Likewise, a Missouri case that denied the
adoption application of a morbidly obese parent directly corresponds to
the argument that Massachusetts’s courts should incorporate parental
health and well-being in an analysis of the best interests of a morbidly
obese child.
A. Incarcerated Parents
An analogy can be drawn between parents with physical limitations
such as morbid obesity and incarcerated parents such as the mother in
the case of Care and Protection of Amalie.176 In that case, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court considered the mother’s parental fitness
and ability to address her children’s special needs in concluding that the
termination of her rights was in the best interests of the children.177
The mother, whose name was not denoted, “was found guilty of
drug trafficking and distribution of controlled substances in a school
zone, and was sentenced to serve seven years in prison.”178 During her
incarceration, her daughter, Amalie, was placed in two different foster
homes.179 Amalie, like the four morbidly obese children discussed in
Part I of this Note, was a child with specialized needs.180 Amalie was
ultimately placed in a residential program to address her special needs;
she showed significant improvement upon this placement, but continued
to require intensive care and supervision.181
The court of appeals considered the mother’s appeal based on her
argument that the juvenile court erred in finding that she was unfit to
parent her two children.182 The court of appeals defined parental
unfitness as “grievous shortcomings or handicaps that put the child’s
welfare much at hazard.”183 Ultimately, the court concluded that the
175. See In re Care and Prot. of Amalie, 872 N.E.2d. 741, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
176. In re Care and Prot. of Amalie, 872 N.E.2d at 746 (upholding the juvenile court’s
finding of parental unfitness and subsequent termination of parental rights as the appropriate
state action based on the best interests of the child).
177. Id. Although this mother had two children, the focus of this case was on Amalie.
178. Id. at 745.
179. Id.
180. In particular, Amalie suffered from reactive attachment disorder, posttraumatic
stress disorder, and ADHD. Id. She was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment and seizures in
addition to being aggressive, self-destructive, suicidal, and violent toward her foster parents.
Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 746.
183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

BRIERLEY FINAL 51313.DOC

2013]

CHILDHOOD MORBID OBESITY: PARENTAL RIGHTS

5/15/13 2:43 PM

157

mother was unfit to parent because she refused to acknowledge that her
involvement with drugs was impacting her ability to parent, refused to
acknowledge that her children had special needs, and that she was
accordingly unable to address those needs.184
The corollary between Amalie and D.K.’s mothers supports the
assertion that Massachusetts courts, when deciding a case involving the
parental rights of a parent of a morbidly obese child, should consider
parental fitness as defined in In re Care and Protection of Amalie. Both
mothers were physically limited—one by her incarceration, the other by
her morbid obesity—in their ability to provide adequate care for their
child’s specialized needs.185
Further, both mothers failed to
acknowledge or address their child’s specialized needs prior to state
involvement.186 However, neither mother was per se unfit due to her
incarceration or morbid obesity. Rather, their unfitness was determined
by the aggravating circumstances coupled with their incarceration and
morbid obesity. For instance, Amalie’s mother, although incarcerated,
was deemed unfit to parent Amalie because of the aggravating
circumstances of drug use and refusal to acknowledge her daughter’s
special needs.187 Similarly, Donna K. was unfit to parent D.K. not only
because of her morbid obesity, but because of the aggravating
circumstances of her lack of initiative in seeking medical attention for
D.K. and her failure to address his absenteeism from school.188
The Massachusetts Appeals Court relied upon precedent
Massachusetts case law that held “[t]he specialized needs of a particular
child when combined with the deficiencies of a parent’s character,
temperament, capacity, or conduct may clearly establish parental
184. Id. The court noted that termination of parental rights is not the automatic result of
a finding of parental unfitness. Id. at 747. Rather, the best interests of the child standard is
the dispositive test for the appropriate state action based on the finding of parental unfitness.
Id. at 746.
185. Although Amalie’s mother was involuntarily limited from providing care to her
children based on her court ordered incarceration, Donna K. voluntarily limited herself from
providing care to D.K. based on her morbid obesity, an almost exclusively preventable
condition. But see Yijun Liu et al., Food Addiction and Obesity: Evidence from Bench to
Bedside, 42(2) J. OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS, June 2010, at 133, 134 (supporting the theory
that “[F]ood addiction is the result of loss of control, impulsive and/or compulsive behavior
that results from emotional and environmental conditions and a psychological dependence on
food.”). Despite scientific studies to suggest that food addiction could be one cause of
obesity, it is uncontroverted that unlike Amalie’s mother, prior to state involvement, Donna K.
was in no way legally prevented from providing care to D.K.
186. In re Care and Prot. of Amalie, 872 N.E.2d at 746; In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th
353, 360 (C.P. 2002).
187. In re Care and Prot. of Amalie, 872 N.E.2d at 746.
188. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 359.
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unfitness.”189
Such analysis gives credence to this Note’s
recommendation that Massachusetts’s courts, when deciding a case of
first impression involving parental rights of a morbidly obese child,
should consider in their analysis the parents’ overall health and wellbeing.190 Physical handicaps such as morbid obesity that impact parents’
ability to provide adequate care for their child’s specialized needs can
jeopardize the child’s welfare and warrant state intervention.
When deciding this issue, Massachusetts’s courts should follow this
Note’s recommendation of including parents’ overall health and wellbeing in their analysis of the best interests of the child because such
inclusion finds support in prior—albeit nonbinding—case law, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court’s decision in Care and Protection of
Amalie, and the applicable sections of the CMR and Massachusetts
General Laws. To decide this issue otherwise would be contrary to the
prior case law, comparable Massachusetts case law, Massachusetts
General Laws and Regulations, and the CMR.
B. Adoption Cases and the Best Interests of the Child Standard
Another parallel can be drawn between the best interests of the
child standard used in neglect and adoption cases and the instant issue.191
The argument that health should not be a determinative factor in whether
or not a parent is suitable to adopt is illustrated by the recent denial of a
Missouri couple’s adoption request based on the father’s obesity.192 The
adoptive father, Gary, weighed approximately 550 pounds at the time he
and his wife sought adoption of a baby named Max.193 After losing 250

189. In re Care and Prot. of Amalie, 872 N.E.2d at 746 (quoting In re Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 463 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)).
190. While Massachusetts’s courts should consider parents’ health and well-being, poor
health alone is not determinative of per se parental unfitness. Similar to incarceration and
drug addition, there must exist other aggravating circumstances to warrant a finding of
unfitness.
191. Courts in other countries have considered adoptive parents’ health, including
weight, in determining whether or not they are suitable for adoption. See Brenda K. DeVries,
Note, Health Should Not be a Determinative Factor of Whether One Will be a Suitable
Adoptive Parent, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 137, 145 (2009). Adoptive parents in South Korea
and Taiwan must have a body mass index (BMI) less than 30. Id. Similarly, China requires
“adoptive parents to have a BMI below 40.” Id. at 145-46. In addition to adoptive parents’
weight, China precludes those “who have a facial deformity; and people who take
antidepressants.” Id. at 146 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 140. MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (West Supp. 2011) only permits disclosure
of nonidentifying information “to the adoptive parents, legal guardians, adopted adult or the
adopted adult’s lineal descendants if the adopted adult is deceased, upon written request
therefor.” Accordingly, the author was unable to obtain a copy of the decision in this case.
193. DeVries, supra note 191, at 140.

BRIERLEY FINAL 51313.DOC

2013]

CHILDHOOD MORBID OBESITY: PARENTAL RIGHTS

5/15/13 2:43 PM

159

pounds as a result of gastric bypass surgery, Gary and his wife’s
application for adoption of Max was granted.194 This suggests that at
least one of the court’s determinative factors in originally denying the
adoption request was Gary’s obesity.195
Every state’s statutory adoption scheme has been liberally
construed to include the best interests of the child standard when
considering adoptions.196 Because the best interests of the child standard
is vague, it is subject to discriminatory opinions rendered by judges.197
Although the factors used by courts in approving adoption requests are
broad and include physical health, it is difficult to determine overall
health to any degree of certainty. For instance, an overweight
prospective parent is not necessarily unhealthy, and a trim and active
prospective parent is not necessarily completely healthy, as he or she
could have a non-obvious serious medical condition.
The best interests of the child standard is similarly applied to both
adoption cases and cases involving removal of a child from the home. In
the case of D.K.’s housebound and morbidly obese mother, the court
considered D.K.’s mother’s physical health and well-being in ruling that
removal of D.K. was appropriate due to his mother’s inability to provide
adequate care.198 Massachusetts’s courts should make determinations
regarding the removal of a morbidly obese child from his or her home
and/or termination of parental rights on a case-by-case basis, taking into
consideration all of the facts and circumstances.
The inclusion of the parents’ health and well-being in determining
removal of a morbidly obese child from the home is appropriate because
a parent’s own morbid obesity directly correlates with the child’s lack of
success with dietary and exercise programs when returned to the
home.199 In a case involving a morbidly obese parent who cannot
physically provide adequate care for his or her own morbidly obese child
with specialized needs, state intervention to seek removal of the child is
justified. While no one factor is dispositive in such an analysis, it is
appropriate to include parents’ obesity and other physical health
concerns in determining whether or not removal is an appropriate
remedy for a case involving childhood morbid obesity.
194. Id. at 141.
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. Because the decision is unavailable to
the author, the exact factors considered by the court remain unknown.
196. DeVries, supra note 191, at 142.
197. Id. at 143.
198. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 359 (C.P. 2002).
199. See New Mexico, ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. John R., 203 P.3d
167, 169 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
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CONCLUSION
It is plain to see that the Pennsylvania court followed the correct
analysis and reached the appropriate conclusion in ordering that D.K.
remain in foster care until such time as, inter alia, his mother could
address her own health concerns to enable her to attend all of her son’s
medical appointments.200
It is because the Pennsylvania court
considered Donna K.’s overall health and well-being, including her own
debilitating morbid obesity, in its analysis of her ability to provide
adequate care of D.K., that D.K. was afforded the opportunity to
continue his weight loss and nutritional success first achieved in foster
care.
If Massachusetts’s courts do not include parents’ overall health and
well-being in their analyses of parental fitness in cases involving
morbidly obese children, it is the child who will ultimately suffer. It is
not surprising that morbidly obese children who have experienced
weight loss success in foster care often revert back to their poor diet and
exercise habits when returned to unfit parents.201 Such a problem could
be prevented in Massachusetts if the courts’ consideration of parental
fitness and ability to care for the child took into account the parents’
own health and well-being, including their physical limitations due to
morbid obesity. Success early on in state intervention would reduce the
need for future state involvement, thus comporting with Massachusetts’s
dual obligations to protect children while preventing warrantless
intrusions into the family unit.
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